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Did We Miss the Joke Again?
The Cultural Learnings of Two Middle East Professors 
for Make Benefit Insights on the Glorious West
Christopher D. Stonebanks & Özlem Sensoy
Taboo, Spring-Summer-Fall-Winter 2007
This is Natalya. [He kisses her passionately] She is my sister. She is number-four 
prostitute in whole of Kazakhstan.
May George Bush drink the blood of every man, woman, and child in Iraq!
Introduction
 Both the film Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glori-
ous Nation of Kazakhstan (2006) and its creator, writer, lead actor, and producer 
Sacha Baron Cohen have received an amazing degree of attention. While the film’s 
humour has been praised for its skilled unmasking of all “isms” in America, its 
box-office and mainstream success is testimony of its broad-based appeal. By its 
16th week, Borat had raked in nearly $250 million dollars in worldwide box-office 
sales ($130 of it domestic U.S.).1 Why? 
 Is it because there is a hunger in North America for critically-conscious 
social commentary in film? Certainly, Borat’s domestic sales do show it on par 
with other heavyweight films, recognized for their social consciousness, such as 
Erin Brockovich, Good Morning Vietnam, Traffic, and The Truman Show. If box 
office revenues are any indicator of success and acknowledgment of excellence, 
then certainly Borat finds itself in this category. If, rather, peer review and critical 
acclaim are the indicators of success, then Cohen’s 2007 Golden Globe for Best 
Actor in a Film Comedy, his Best Film nomination at the Golden Globes, and a Best 
Adapted Screenplay nomination for the Oscars should all be evidence that this is 
a great film, worth seeing. Adding to all of these arguments are the critics’ reviews 
that note the movie’s deep provocation of dialogue about social issues. In a recent 
Rolling Stone article in support of many of the accolades of Cohen, Strauss (2006) 
pondered a scene from Cohen’s television program, The Ali G Show (from which the 
character Borat was born). The scene is set in a country and western bar in which 
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Borat encourages patrons to sing along to a song called, ‘Throw the Jew Down the 
Well.’ Strauss writes, “Did it reveal that they were anti-Semitic? Perhaps. But maybe 
it just revealed that they were indifferent to anti-Semitism.” Strauss’s not-so-subtle 
applause for Cohen’s skill at revealing such indifference is evidence that there is a 
hunger for socially-relevant artistic production in the North American context. 
 This exposure of mainstream ideologies is nothing new to those who live in 
other parts of the world, although it is an aspect of artistic production that is less 
widely accessed in current mainstream American culture. Thus we can agree that 
filmmakers such as Cohen should be applauded for their efforts to reveal insidi-
ous indifferences toward anti-Semitism, and toward other marginalized social 
groups. However, an important aspect of just how this revelation occurs (and for 
whom it occurs) has been absent from the discussions we have witnessed. The 
characters, settings, situations, and revelations of all -isms (revelations that are 
explained to be social commentary) depend upon a purposeful articulation of 
all things expressed as opposite to “America.” What we will argue is that unlike 
the humour tropes that have made Borat as profitable as other films utilizing sex-
ism, heterosexism, classism, and ableism as comedic devices (films like Dumb 
and Dumber or Wayne’s World), Borat overwhelmingly depends on the central 
character’s embodiment of Muslim-Eastern stereotypes, embodiments that we 
read as xenophobic cinematic Islamophobia. What “we” ultimately laugh at is 
that which simultaneously reviles us. In this article, we will describe how the 
discourses that Borat’s humour and social commentary rely upon continue to 
marginalize those who embody the non-White, non-Christian, non-heterosexual, 
non-male body, and argue that if the racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, 
ableism, xenophobia, anti-Seimitism, and Islamophobia in North America were 
truly taken up in cinematic critique, the box office, mainstream distribution, and 
attention toward this film might look quite different. 
Why Study Borat? 
 With the ascent of courses in North America’s teacher education programs that 
require increased knowledge about race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and 
other socially-constructed categories of difference, courses such as “Multicultural-
ism” or “Media Awareness” in current university curricula are common. Given this 
attention, one might fairly expect there would be significant attention and discussion 
about the “desert minstrel” (Steinberg, 2004) characterization that Borat portrays. 
Surely, in our Canadian context, from Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s 1971 
commencement of the Multiculturalism Act to our current deliberations on how 
we can best prepare our citizens to participate in a multicultural community, Borat 
himself as a stereotype ought to be as central to conversations about the film as 
Borat’s prejudice towards others is. But, once again, this critique is absent from 
mainstream, public discussion. Despite the torrent of accolades heaped upon Cohen’s 
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creation, whether purposeful or not, Borat represents another illustration of what 
it means to be of the continued stereotyped nefarious Muslim Other. 
If You’re Not in It, You’re out of It
 Clearly, a quick read of the positive reviews of Borat reveals to the viewer that 
there is a higher understanding of the content, and that if you missed “it,” it likely 
indicates a deficiency on your part; perhaps comedic, perhaps social. The prevail-
ing arguments of support are best summed up by the late, great Joey Ramone, “If 
you’re not in it, you’re out of it.” A kind of “academic-hipster” challenge, if you 
will. A challenge that silences you for fear that you might seem at once uncool, 
unsophisticated, and dumb. Art/film critics like Lepage (2006) state that “…Cohen 
is the Sex Pistols of humour” (P. H. 7), Goodman (2006) quotes a comedian and 
founder of the comedy club Yuk-Yuks, Mark Breslin’s assertion “(t)he kind of people 
who would go see an independent comedy are smart enough to get the joke” (P. D. 
10), and Groen simply states “Borat at its best is pure satiric genius …” (P. R. 7). 
So all of these accolades do leave us wondering if, as was the case with so many 
Western media caricatures of everything that is associated with the Middle East, 
West Asia, Islam, and Muslims in general, we have once again “missed the joke.” 
Are we, “out of ‘it’?” 
 To better comprehend the responses to Borat within the United States, Cana-
dian, and United Kingdom markets, we began with a simple request to our research 
assistant, Patrick Boisvert: 15 “online” hours to amass as much information as pos-
sible regarding critical reviews of Borat. Through his searches he perused at least 
26 major Canadian television, news, and magazine sources, 23 American televi-
sion, news, and magazine sources, and 17 British television, news, and magazine 
sources. The end result of the 15 hours (plus) in front of his computer: 53 positive 
(to glowing) reviews, 16 somewhat ambiguous assessments, and only six negative 
critiques. Of the positive reviews, much was said of the film being an insight into 
the “American Psyche,” revealing “… America as it is, not as it imagines itself to 
be” (Monk, 2007, B. 1), noting its social contributions of revealing the many “isms” 
of North America and the “genius” of both the film and Cohen himself (Mallick, 
2006). Of the positive reviews we accessed, nothing was mentioned of the racism 
associated with the Borat character. Curiously, Borat is often referred to as a being to 
“itself ”; an actual person altogether separate from Cohen, compounded by Cohen’s 
reluctance to market his film out of character. For instance, when Borat initiates 
racist and sexist conversations, it is portrayed as if it is a natural conversation, as 
opposed to one of the participants having a script and the other simply responding 
to the words. What is lost is the understanding that there is no Borat. Cohen exists 
and the words spoken by the character Borat are Cohen’s. To our recollection, the 
only spontaneous racist statement that came from the non-acting participants was 
the cowboy/general manager of the rodeo, Bobby Rowe, who spoke about Muslims 
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and terrorists and cautioned the Borat character that he “looked like one of them” 
(following this up with a healthy dose of homophobia). 
 Herein is the overwhelmingly overlooked element of Borat; that the film is 
heavily reliant on the West’s fear, and sentiments of superiority over the East and 
Islam. It is through the ignorance, backwardness, oppressive normalcy of Borat the 
character that the humour plays out. His ignorance is positioned as opposite to the 
audience’s (West’s) enlightenment, modernity, and stance of liberty and equality. 
These are among the oldest tropes of Orientalist rhetoric, namely to position the 
Other as something that both reviles and appeals to “us” (Said, 1978). It (the Orient 
and those who represent it) is both exotic and inferior. 
Absent from the Debate
 Much of the North American discourses in regard to multicultural issues, in 
cinema and otherwise, are still predominantly dominated by power bloc voices 
(Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997). “Sikhs carrying Kirpans,” “Filipinos eating rice 
with spoons,” and “the problem” of “Muslim girls wearing hejabs” in school are 
all subjects of news headlines and 24-hour news punditry debates. Recent North 
American politicians’ offhand comments like “les yeux bridés,” “Paki,” or “Ma-
caca” are, to a greater and lesser extent, examined and explained by those who 
have uttered the words, rather than those to whom the words are aimed. Much is 
the same in the Borat discussion; amongst the multitude of accolades showered 
upon Cohen is the small minority of voices that question the nobility of Cohen’s 
film. Specifically absent are the voices of Kazakhs, and all those who are impli-
cated with the stereotypes that Cohen has evoked. Again, those who are not the 
targets of the offense tell all of us what is and is not offensive and racist. Like the 
character Borat, “we” who are the Oriental other are too backward to understand 
the significant contributions this film makes as social commentary, contributions 
that outweigh any offense we may feel. Few have asked, what might the character 
mean for those it names as representing?
 In one of Edward Said’s (2002) last writings, he reflected that some forms 
of speaking on behalf of certain ethnic/racial groups by Occidental (Western) re-
searchers are now considered inappropriate. Purposefully using the word “Negro” 
to demonstrate what not so long ago was acceptable public vocabulary, Said wrote 
“… it has now become inappropriate to speak on behalf of ‘Negroes’ …” (p. 71). 
While many in the power blocks now shake their head in public disapproval to speech 
that is now reserved for private conversations, xenophobic and paternalistic state-
ments and sentiments still permeate North American discourse. For example, the 
overwhelming multitude of non-Muslim men and women who define what a hejab 
signifies to Muslim women in public spaces exists alongside popularly-expressed 
sentiments to “help” those Muslim women. This discourse of aid depends upon 
a deeply-embedded way of knowing the Muslim woman as inherently oppressed. 
Christopher D. Stonebanks & Özlem Sensoy 45
Going further, to know the non-Muslim woman as liberated is dependent upon 
knowing the Muslim woman as oppressed. Sally Field, playing Betty Mahmoody 
(not her birth surname), in the popular film, Not Without my Daughter, was a 
powerful illustration of this sentiment. A non-Muslim woman who is presented as 
knowing “both sides.” 
 Cinema does not differ greatly from popular sentiment, since any popular media 
representation depends upon a discourse the audience is already familiar with to tell 
its story. The hero overcoming unanticipated obstacles story, the unrequited lovers 
story, the road trip story are all formulas that movie-going audiences are familiar 
with. Just saying “unrequited lovers story” serves as a short-hand vocabulary for 
all the meanings, plot turns, likely scenarios, scenes that the audience can expect to 
encounter. The many racisms perpetuated in film have, over time, undergone trans-
formation. Bogle’s (1995) Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies & Bucks chronicles 
the beginning of racist/stereotyped portrayals of African Americans in film and the 
changes that have occurred over time. Comparatively, and in no way suggesting that 
those of African diaspora are now free from Hollywood’s stereotypes for we would 
argue that the oppression of people of Black heritage has gotten more complex 
rather than been “resolved,” a peruse of Shaheen’s (2001) tome chronicling ethno-
racial stereotypes about Arabs (Iranians, Muslims, and the Middle East in general) 
in cinema reveals that there has been little to no change in their treatment. Why?
 A familiar tool in the medium of film is the need for the Other to propel the 
storyline, to assure a “they” in comparison to “us.” The movie medium has run 
through their ethnic, religious, and ideological characters to act as foils, sidekicks, 
clowns, or some other prop against the Hollywood archetypes of “good.” Jews, Com-
munists, Irish, Native Indians, African Americans, Africans, Aboriginals, Asians, 
etc … have all had their share at playing the role of antagonist or supporting role 
to the West’s White protagonist. Where some groups, the Irish for example, have 
managed to break away from the monolith stereotypes of Hollywood, often by just 
fading into Whiteness, or fading out of view altogether, others like the West’s image 
of the “Middle-Eastern Muslim” retain the status of terrifying villain, backward 
buffoon, or oppressed victim, often in need of salvation from their own ethnic and/or 
religious tyranny. Borat, with its reliance on the primitive buffoonery of the main 
character, sets out on a quest to gain knowledge from the wise West. And whether 
intentionally or not, its impact is part of a familiar pattern of stereotypes about 
people of the Muslim East and needs to be understood for the stark similarities this 
representation has to minstrel-like characteristics. 
Desert Minstrels and Brownface
 Before we risk being perceived as oversensitive killjoys, and for the sake of 
clarity, yes, we understand the humour. We comprehend the comedic devices and 
the ridiculousness of the contexts and how the movie’s message relies heavily on 
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the over-the-top ignorance of Borat, the shock of his targets, and that this makes the 
situations funny. What we are attempting to do in this article is to unravel that rather 
than a novelty and bravery of social commentary, Borat parallels a typical, familiar, 
historical pattern of minstrel-like portrayals of Muslims, Middle-Easterners, East 
Asians, South-East Asians and the generalized Eastern Other in cinema—whether 
it falls into the category of a continued acceptance of “brownface,” from Sam Jaffe 
in Gunga Din (1939), Peter Sellers in The Party (1968) to Will Ferrell in Austin 
Powers (1997), that has been used to represent “the East” or whether it is some-
thing altogether different.1 We also question, whether Borat is being perceived by 
audiences and critics as a satire in the same manner of Spike Lee’s Bamboozled 
(2000), demanding its audience to question the morality of enjoying overt racial 
stereotypes, or falling into the same ethical dangers that comedian Dave Chapelle 
warned in response to his now infamous “Pixie Sketch”; whether the audience is 
laughing at the satirical elements or at the stereotypes themselves. Just as movie 
stories depend upon a short-hand plot signal (such as “the love story”) to tell their 
stories, we believe Borat uses the short-hand vocabulary that “Eastern Muslim 
foreigner” offers (via its tools like dark moustachioed men, brown skin, ‘funny’ 
clothes, and the thick non-descript accents) to tell its story.
 In using Steinberg’s (2004) term “desert-minstrel” in reference to Muslim-East-
ern characters, we are offering two thoughts: first, that there is a Muslim-Easterner 
equivalent, in film, to the slow-witted, lazy, superstitious jester that stereotyped 
African Americans for decades; and, second, that in using “brownface,” modified 
from “blackface”—a term associated with minstrel shows, we are suggesting that 
the prevailing characteristics of the Muslim-Easterner in popular film is a creation 
of those who wield power, as opposed to those that such images represent, even 
when played by actors who are of Muslim-Eastern origin. While the blackface im-
age and discourses embedded in it may have gone underground (only to be revealed 
in unguarded moments by men like Michael Richards or Don Imus), we believe the 
colonialist roots and contemporary political and military social discourses in the West 
continue to uphold the brownface stereotypes upon which films like Borat rely. 
 On the subject of brownface, Stephen Colbert, in his usual earnest yet deadpan 
style, noted the futility of his guest, Iranian actor/comedian Maz Jobrani’s, stance 
that he would no longer audition for stereotypical terrorist roles and said, “…would 
you be willing to see White actors in Arab-face?” (October, 2006). Of course, as 
far as we are concerned these brownface roles have been played by White actors, 
and the stories of the Muslim Middle East have been told by non-Muslims and 
non-Middle Easterners for centuries. Perhaps, one might be led to believe that there 
is something altogether acceptable about brownface, if you agree that it exists at 
all. Consider Will Ferrell’s character of Mustaffa, the assassin, in Austin Powers. 
A quick internet search for the character’s image and you will have to decide for 
yourself: either Ferrell spent quite an extreme amount of time and energy tan-
ning, or someone applied brown pancake makeup to assure that the audience not 
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be confused about what “Mustaffa” ought to look like. If the second is the case, 
brownface exists. As to whether brownface is acceptable, then the consideration 
must be made as to whether or not it serves to benefit or detract from the peoples it 
represents, and perhaps that answer can be found in those actors of Muslim and/or 
Eastern decent that have played these roles. 
 Actor/comedian Omid Djalili, of Middle-Eastern origin, describes the recurring 
jobs he was offered as the “Arab-scumbag” (2001) roles. His own way of handling 
the humiliation of the stereotyped acting work was by adding more comedy to the 
part. Despite this, in his 2003 National Public Radio interview, the actor/comedian 
begins to further reveal the degrading nature of these characters.
NPR: … in the lavish adventure movie The Mummy Djalili played a “greasy” 
Egyptian prison warden.
Djalili: Really, a “filthy Arab” …just the butt of all the jokes. And I slide down a 
rope and John Hannah says, “What’s that awful smell?” and my buttocks comes 
into view and it’s all that stuff (laughs). 
 Although there are connections Djalili (2001) makes with his acting predeces-
sors who endured similar ethnic stereotyping, such as Nadim Sawahla and Burt 
Kwouk, “… who always performed with gusto, but also seemed to do it with an 
ironic twinkle in their eye,” one has to wonder whether or not other film viewers 
pick up on such subtleties. In essence, as Dave Chapelle pondered, are they laugh-
ing with or at the stereotyped characters? 
Are You Laughing at Borat or with Borat?
 Part of the process of analyzing whether or not the humour in Borat is based 
on Islamophobia or racialized Islam is to determine whether or not Borat is seen 
by the audience as a Muslim. From our searches we can not comment on Cohen’s 
intent because, as to date, he has not directly addressed the race, ethnicity, or reli-
gious aspect of his Borat character, or for that matter his Ali G character. What we 
can discuss is the seemingly purposeful ambiguity that Cohen utilizes in regard to 
religion and race and the perceptions it evokes in scenes with everyday Americans, 
and with viewers. Although the responses of film-goers to the Islamophobia elicited 
by the Borat character are ignored by the majority of film critics who positively 
reviewed the film, they were major considerations for those who found the film to 
be utilizing a “baser” comedic approach. 
 Although rarely using the term “brownface,” some authors referred to the 
“blackface” nature of Cohen’s characters, noting earlier work with Ali G elicited this 
response in viewers. Not really disapproving of Cohen’s work, in Yakasai’s (2003) 
review he quotes a 19-year-old London resident, originally from Mali, who notes 
that he can see “… a similarity between him and the old comedians wearing shoe 
polish as black” and continues with his “man on the street” examination conclud-
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ing from various sources that he should not be taken “…too seriously…” and that 
ultimately, he is “…a novelty… .” Fast forward to 2006 and Cohen’s character is 
smashing attendance records and reaching a wide audience. In another positive 
review of Borat, Rich Cohen (2006) noted that Baron Cohen was met with accusa-
tions of racism earlier in his career:
He’s been criticized for performing a variation of the minstrel show: a Jewish boy 
in blackface. When he went to promote his first movie, Ali G Indahouse, he was 
met by protestors, some carrying signs that said, AL JOLSON, GO HOME. 
 Although he does describe Borat as a “…perfect mirror of the age,” Rich Cohen 
also raises Sacha Baron Cohen’s often cited graduate thesis on “Jews in civil-rights 
movements” stating, “In fact, every article about the comedian mentions Cambridge 
(look, I just did it myself) because, I’m convinced, it makes the more disturbing 
parts of his act less unacceptable.” In discussing Sacha Baron Cohen’s international 
ascendance from the British cable market, where his act had lost its edge, to the 
United States, Rich Cohen wrote, “ … so he came to America, which offered the 
same shot it offers all pilgrims—the dream, the hills and prairies, but mostly a 
chance to start over, and a whole nation of fresh marks.” Perhaps, what Rich Cohen 
did not intend in the analogy, is that the pilgrims received all their bounty at the 
expense of another. In Sacha Baron Cohen’s case, part of his success comes from 
not only revealing America’s trouble with racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, etc…, 
but does so at the expense of its accepted perceptions of the stereotyped Muslim 
and Middle-Easterner. But there is no suggestion that Borat is Muslim; his only 
religion seems to be anti-Semitism (Hoberman, 2006).
 Certainly, there is not part of the film where Cohen scripts Borat to state ex-
plicitly that he is Muslim. Even if we analyze the major religions of Kazakhstan 
it would not reveal as much as the choice of using Kazakhstan as Borat’s place of 
birth because it evokes so much of the “one of those “stan” countries”, much like 
the “Iraq, Iran … whatever!” mentalities in the viewer. As Drummond (2006) ob-
serves, “… ‘Borat’ resonates so much with audiences because of the West’s unease 
about Muslim cultural attitudes. (…) Borat’s blend of misogyny, anti-Semitism, 
and general backwardness all carefully correspond with American stereotypes of 
Islam.” Drummond further remarks that these are very specific stereotypes that the 
West has imposed upon the “Muslim culture.” Similarly, Tierney (2006) writes, 
“What bothers me most about the movie is its premise: that villagers who have 
not embraced Western values are violently anti-Semitic, racist, homophobic and 
misogynistic. Borat is an absurd caricature, but we wouldn’t laugh if we didn’t think 
there was some truth to the stereotype of the morally backward peasant” (Tierney, 
2006, P. A 15).
 “Are you laughing with Borat or at Borat?” is an important question. Cohen’s 
character, as Drummond points out, is more than just a “generic Third Worlder who 
did not remind audiences of a Muslim in any way whatsoever.” In trying to uncover 
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hidden racisms, Cohen has chosen a character that represents racist stereotypes and 
a stereotype that one is “free” to exploit. Quite frankly, no Muslim group would 
have received any attention from the media or moviegoers in general, because, as 
Drummond sums up, whereas Americans may have felt guilty at laughing at an 
“African tribesman,” they “… felt no guilt in laughing at Borat.” As the majority 
of reviewers praise Cohen and his valour, very few note this aspect and ask “why 
are we laughing?” or at the very least say, yes, you may have laughed, but “(j)ust 
don’t call it politically courageous satire” (Boler, 2006). 
Conclusion:
We May Have Missed the Joke, but Here’s What We Didn’t Miss
 We didn’t miss that Borat depends upon a classical, gendered Orientalist dis-
course to tell the story of a backward Muslim man, oppressing Muslim women. But 
this time, the Muslim woman’s oppression is not marked by her veil, it is marked by 
her villiager-body, whorish allusion, and willingness to have sex with anybody will-
ing to take her. Although a familiar sexist stereotype of old-school Western sexism, 
this Madonna/whore binary is not unknown in Western representations of Muslim 
women. In a brilliant critique of National Geographic’s representation of the Arab 
world and Muslim women, Steet (2000) writes that Muslim women have been the 
object of the Western male gaze, and their bodies displayed and presented as an 
accessible soft-core porn for over a century. In fact, the belly-dancing seductress is 
a common representation of all that is sexual, yet exoticized enough to allude to a 
perverse fetishism of the Muslim woman’s body. By representing Muslim women’s 
oppression as the same as Western women’s (i.e., both are fetishized and sexualized 
objects), Borat as a character is brought closer to its mainstream audience: presum-
ably “men” (i.e., all “normal” heterosexual men) who share the fetishized, sexualized 
fantasies about women’s bodies. As evident in the film, Borat’s ability to befriend and 
ally himself with American men depends upon a narrative of classic sexism. 
 We didn’t miss that this gendered Orientalist discourse, establishing a binary 
within a binary (male/ female, liberated/ oppressed), is simultaneously tapping in 
to heterosexist norms in mainstream Western culture. In a critique of the masculin-
ist, homophobic discourses in pro-wrestling, Jhally & Katz (2000) argue that the 
creation of an heroic, masculine body whose very body and essence is a spectacle 
of heteronormativity, depends upon the creation of a feminized body against which 
the masculinity is on display. In describing the relationship between the hyper-
masculinity on display in pro-wrestling, and its relation to homophobia, they write, 
“The hyper-masculine wrestling subculture is also deeply infused with homophobic 
anxiety. Macho posturing and insults…can barely mask the fear of feminization 
that is always present in the homoerotic entanglement of male bodies.” It is hard to 
argue that a very real pro-wrestling Smackdown style homoerotic entanglement of 
male bodies does not take place in Borat. Once again, Borat embodies traditional 
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mainstream White male heteronormative fears and fascinations. This is further 
evidenced by the way in which Borat is welcomed into the fold of traditional White 
male collegiality. Many of the film’s “real life” men express a liking for Borat, 
and many in fact give Borat tips on how to take his overt sexism and homophobia 
underground (rodeo official advises: shave the moustache; car dealer nodding his 
head in understanding as Borat says, When I uh, buy my wife, she was, cook good, 
her vagine work well and she strong on plough. But after three years when she 
was, uh, fifteen, then she become weak, her voice become deep, etc). We believe 
this affinity is a glorification of nothing other than a traditional “old boys club” 
fraternity. Borat embodies all of the sexist, homophobic, xenophobic sentiments 
that mainstream “old boys” can no longer express in public.
 We also did not miss that Borat depends on a class-narrative to set up the 
jokes. Social class is an undeniable organizer of social life in the United States. 
How is Borat different from the “White trash” on display in any classist depiction 
of poverty in rural United States? He has poor manners, speaks with a drawl, is at 
times incoherent, travels with a chicken, has sex with his cousin, dresses in clothing 
that is out of style and too big for him, he does not know “big city” ways, has never 
been in a “fancy” elevator, and on and on it goes. How different is Borat from the 
Hillbillies on their way to Beverly Hills? 
 To us, it really is not so funny. In fact, for both of us of who come from 
Middle Eastern heritage, this film was difficult to watch. Although yes, to some 
degree, it could be argued that it has evoked a debate on its social commentary. 
Rather than brilliant social critique, the comment we heard was this: mainstream 
middle-America is racist, sexist, heterosexist, ableist, classist, xenophobic, and 
Islamaphobic—although we suspect that if you spoke to anyone on the growing 
margins of middle-America, you would find few surprised faces to this comment. 
What is significant is that liberal North Americans and those who would describe 
themselves as progressive and who are most likely to find this film appealing and 
powerful, fall into the same myopic views that further continue to oppress others, 
which is now articulated within a global, colonialist vocabulary of difference. 
Notes
 1 http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=borat.htm
 2 Of interest is that Rich Cohen (2006) notes that Sacha Baron Cohen’s hero is Peter 
Sellers and that he is friends with Will Ferrell. 
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